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RESEARCH AND PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Research Associate , ESMT Berlin	2020–Present
Research Assistant , Hilltop Institute	2013–2014
Internship , United States Bureau of Labor Statistics	2012
Instructional Designer , The Leslie Group	2006–2010

EDUCATION

Ph.D. in Economics, Rice University DISSERTATION: Essays on the Economics of Communication and Disclosure Dissertation submitted and all degree requirements completed. Degree conferral on August 31, 2020.	August 2020
M.A. in Economic Policy Analysis, University of Maryland – Baltimore County	May 2014
B.A. in Economics, University of Maryland – Baltimore County	May 2013
B.A. in Mathematics, University of Maryland – Baltimore County	May 2013

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE

Prof. Hulya Eraslan (**co-chair**)
Department of Economics
Rice University
(713) 348-3453
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Prof. Mallesh Pai (**co-chair**)
Department of Economics
Rice University
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Prof. K. Ramesh
Department of Accounting
Rice University
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RESEARCH AND TEACHING FIELDS

Primary: Applied Microeconomic Theory.

Secondary: Political Economy, Industrial Organization, Media Economics.

SCHOLARSHIPS, HONORS, AND AWARDS

The Timothy and Katharine Gunning Award for Best Third Year Paper, Rice University <i>“Online News and Editorial Standards”</i>	2018
The George Zodrow Award for Best Performance in a Workshop, Rice University	2018
The Michael Maher Graduate Student Teaching Prize in Economics, Rice University	2017
Rica and Tony Ligeralde Fellowship Award for Best Performance in Economic Theory Qualifying Exam	2016

Newcombe Scholarship, University of Maryland – Baltimore County	2011–2013
Gerald R. Goldman Economics Scholarship, University of Maryland – Baltimore County	2012–2013
Summer Economics Scholarship, University of Maryland – Baltimore County	2012
Transfer Student Scholarship	2011–2013

RESEARCH PAPERS

Online News and Editorial Standards

Job Market Paper

The internet enables a media firm to post information received from leads at any time. To examine the effect that this has on the probability of posting incorrect news, I compare a scenario in which the news can be posted and updated at any time on a continuum to a scenario in which news can only be posted at a fixed time. I determine the editorial standard, which is a cutoff that determines how certain a firm must be in order to initially post an article. When changing a story is costless, if the firm can post at any time, it will post with weakly less information than it would with a predetermined posting time. If changing a story is costly, then the firm's editorial standard is weakly higher when it can post at any time than when there is just one posting time, and this editorial standard decreases over time. A lower editorial standard implies that the firm will be more likely to post incorrect news, so this implies that a firm may be more cautious with releasing internet news than it would be with releasing a newspaper article. However, if the firm has a strong prior about the event, it may post earlier with less information when it can post on the internet at any time.

Wage Disclosure

Job applicants are often asked to disclose their current wages on their job applications, but recently implemented policies in a number of jurisdictions have prohibited this question. This policy change makes wage disclosure a strategic choice for applicants. What effect does this policy change have on who is hired and how much they are paid? Can this type of policy help close a wage gap based on exogenous characteristics such as gender and race? I consider a model in which an applicant applies for a job, and the employer can choose to make an offer to the applicant at a cost. I find that if an applicant does not know how much she will benefit from the job when submitting the application, then there can exist a partial disclosure equilibrium in which the applicant conceals her wage if it is low or high, but reveals it if it is in an intermediate range. This implies that the typical unravelling results common in models of voluntary disclosure may not occur. In any such equilibrium, no type of applicant is worse off than she would be under full disclosure, and some values of the applicants are better off. The effect of this policy on the wage gap is ambiguous. If the offer cost is relatively low, the policy may increase the wage gap, while if the offer cost is relatively high, it may decrease it.

Student Loan Debt and Home Purchase with Mehreen Gul, Rice University

The rapidly increasing levels of educational debt incurred by American students raises concerns over the effects that the debt could have on their ability to achieve their long-term goals, including homeownership. While amount of student loan debt held by households has increased over the last few decades, homeownership rates among young adults have declined. Additionally, if borrowers are taking out more loans to attain higher education, then higher future earnings could potentially mitigate the effect of student loan payments on home purchase. It is important to determine if the negative effect of student debt on housing demand is exceeded by the positive effect that comes from higher future earnings. The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between student loan debt and housing demand.

When to Ask for an Update: Timing in Strategic Communication with Ying Chen, Johns Hopkins University

A principal (receiver) considers whether to accept a project of uncertain value. The total value depends

on the values of two aspects. In each period, an agent (sender) privately learns the value of one aspect with positive probability. We compare two reporting protocols: frequent updating and infrequent updating. Frequent updating requires the sender to report in each period; infrequent updating requires him to report only at the end of the learning process. The sender is biased towards acceptance; he may conceal his signal, but cannot misrepresent his information in other ways. If the project's expected value is lower than the receiver's acceptance threshold, then the equilibrium outcome is the same regardless of the reporting protocol under certain regularity conditions. This equivalence implies that if soliciting a report is costly, then frequent updating is inefficient, but if there is gain from early resolution, then frequent updating is better. In contrast, if the project's expected value is sufficiently high, then reporting protocol matters. Specifically, if it is sufficiently unlikely for the sender to observe an informative signal in a later period or the divergence of interests is sufficiently low, then the receiver is better off by requiring frequent updating since it encourages the sender to reveal provisionally unfavorable information early on. When the probability of the sender observing an informative signal in a later period is sufficiently high, however, the receiver is better off asking for only one report at the end of the learning process.

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Instructor, Rice University Fall 2016 – Summer 2019

Graduate: Math Camp for Economics (in-person and online)

Teaching Assistant, Rice University Fall 2014–Present

Graduate: Microeconomics (Game Theory)

Undergraduate: Market Design, Math for Economics, Law and Economics, Corporate Finance.

RESEARCH AND PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Research Assistant, Hilltop Institute 2013–2014

Internship, United States Bureau of Labor Statistics 2012

Instructional Designer, The Leslie Group 2006–2010

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

Presentations

Southern Economic Association, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida	2019 (scheduled)
Texas Economic Theory Camp, Austin, Texas	2019 (scheduled)
Texas Economic Theory Camp, Dallas, Texas	2018
International Conference on Game Theory, Stony Brook, NY	2018
Midwest Economic Theory Conference, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania	2018
Western Economic Association International Conference, Newcastle, Australia	2018
Texas Economic Theory Camp, College Station, Texas	2017
Rice University Brown Bag Seminar	2017, 2019 (scheduled)
Theoretical Political Economy Session at the American Economic Association meeting (discussant)	2017
The Consumer Expenditure Survey Microdata Users Workshop at the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics in Washington, DC	2013

Summer Schools

Summer School in Economics, Jerusalem, Israel	2016, 2018
Summer School of the Econometric Society, Kyoto, Japan	2016

Other

Chair of the Graduate Student Recruitment Committee, Rice University	2015–2019
Student representative, Graduate Economics Association	2015–2016, 2018–2019

Referee for Dynamic Games and Applications, Econometrica, International Journal of Game Theory, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.